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ABSTRACT—A long-standing consensus exists that the arbitrary or
excessive expropriation of private property by a country hurts its economic
growth. Although constitutions can play an important role in protecting
private property, remarkably little is known about how they actually restrict
the power of eminent domain and whether such restrictions are associated
with reduced de facto expropriation risks. This Essay fills that gap by
presenting original data on the procedural and substantive protections in
constitutional takings clauses from 1946 to 2013. Its main finding is that no
observable relationship exists between de jure constitutional restrictions on
the power of eminent domain and de facto expropriation risks.
This Essay explores two possible explanations for why
constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain fail to make a
difference in practice. The first is that countries adopt disingenuous
promises to bolster their international reputation or to attract foreign aid.
The second explanation holds that societal disagreements over the desired
level of expropriation might be built into the constitution’s design. Such
disagreements emerge when a portion of citizens believe they benefit more
from expropriation than from the general benefits that flow from secure
property rights.
This Essay finds empirical support for the second explanation.
Specifically, it finds that real-world constitutional property regimes are
often riddled with ambiguities. That is, constitutions often include strong
procedural and substantive restrictions on the power of eminent domain but
also include “fine print” that can undermine those restrictions. This Essay
finds that when accounting for such fine print, constitutional restrictions on
the power of eminent domain appear to be correlated with reduced
expropriation risks. This finding suggests that the effectiveness of takings
clauses might depend on the politics surrounding their adoption.
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INTRODUCTION
A long-standing consensus exists that arbitrary or excessive
expropriation of private property by a country hurts its economic growth.1
When private property is not secure, international investors avoid making

1

One study shows that England, after the Glorious Revolution, improved long-term economic
performance by credibly committing to property rights. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast,
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in SeventeenthCentury England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803 (1989). Since then, numerous cross-country studies have
shown that a robust connection exists between secure property rights and long-run economic
performance. See, e.g., Philip Keefer, Beyond Legal Origin and Checks and Balances: Political
Credibility, Citizen Information and Financial Sector Development (World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 4145, 2007); Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Polarization, Politics and Property
Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth, 111 PUB. CHOICE 127 (2002). For an overview of the
literature, see Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 205, 207 (2008). Related economic literature has focused on the importance of “institutions” in
ensuring economic growth but also tends to emphasize the importance of property rights protections.
See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in
1A HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 385 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2005); Daron
Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,
5 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) [hereinafter Acemoglu et al., Colonial Origins].
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long-term investments in the country. 2 Likewise, citizens underinvest in
property because, considering the risk of expropriation, they discount its
future value. 3 Indeed, economists have long emphasized the importance of
secure private property rights as a crucial ingredient for economic growth.4
In fact, one recent empirical study suggests protecting private property
from government intervention is the single most important institutional
predictor of economic growth. 5
Constitutional scholars have often suggested that constitutions can
play an important role in protecting private property from arbitrary or
excessive government expropriation.6 Constitutions contain various
mechanisms that can restrict a government’s ability to deviate from the
constitutions’ promises ex post. As a result, constitutions allow
governments to credibly commit to respect private property and to signal to
investors, capital markets, and individual citizens alike that their property is
secure from expropriation.

2

See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 51–52 (1990) (noting that secure property rights increase long-term investment because
they reduce uncertainty and stabilize expectations); Janice E. Thomson & Stephen D. Krasner, Global
Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL
CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO WORLD POLITICS FOR THE 1990S, at 195, 214 (Ernst-Otto Czempiel &
James N. Rosenau eds., 1989) (observing that “[w]ithout secure property rights market activities would
be constrained because of uncertainty about the possessor’s right to sell the commodity and the threat to
achieve transfers through force and coercion rather than voluntary exchange,” as a result of which
“[c]apital allocation would be aimed at maximizing short term gain—getting out before the rules of the
game were changed”). A body of literature demonstrates empirically that secure property rights
encourage foreign direct investment. See, e.g., Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen Jr., Economic Reforms
and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America, 41 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 51 (2006); Yi
Feng, Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions
and Private Investment in Developing Countries, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 271 (2001); Nathan Jensen,
Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment, 70 J. POL. 1040 (2008); Quan
Li, Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation of Foreign Direct Investment, 42 COMP. POL. STUD.
1098 (2009); Quan Li & Adam Resnick, Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign
Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries, 57 INT’L ORG. 175 (2003).
3
See Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of
Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LIT. 1137, 1139 (1972) (“It is not difficult to accept the basic idea that
‘property rights’ tend to influence incentives and behavior.” (citation omitted)).
4
See supra note 1.
5
Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949, 953 (2005).
6
North & Weingast, supra note 1, at 805–08 (suggesting that credible constitutional commitments
to protect private property allow governments to access capital); see also Daniel A. Farber, Rights as
Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88–89 (2002) (suggesting that constitutional commitments to respect
private property can attract foreign direct investors); John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment
and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (2003) (describing constitutions as pre-commitment
devices and noting that “[a] government that is constitutionally barred from expropriating property is
thereby better able to attract capital”); David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional
Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1309–10 (2008) (suggesting that countries can use their bill of rights,
and especially their property rights protections, to compete for foreign investment).
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Although constitutions can assist states in reaping the long-term
economic benefits associated with secure property rights, remarkably little
is known of how constitutions actually curb the power of eminent domain 7
or whether such restrictions are associated with reduced de facto
expropriation risks. This Essay fills that gap by presenting original and
fine-grained data on the procedural and substantive restrictions that the
world’s constitutions have placed on the power of eminent domain from
1946 to 2013. 8 With this data, this Essay documents cross-country variation
in takings clauses, including their development over time. It also provides
an empirical exploration of the relationship between de jure constitutional
restrictions on the power of eminent domain and de facto or real-world
expropriation risks. Its core finding is that no observable relationship exists
between de jure takings clauses and de facto government respect for private
property. However, when accounting for the ambiguities built into the
constitution’s design, stronger de jure restrictions on the power of eminent
domain do appear to be correlated with reduced de facto expropriation
risks.
This Essay begins by articulating the conventional wisdom on why
takings clauses are supposed to reduce de facto expropriation risks. 9 It
starts from the assumption that, for most states, the long-term economic
benefits of restricting the power of eminent domain will outweigh the
short-term gains of expropriation. Yet, a commitment to curb arbitrary or
excessive expropriation will pay off only when it is perceived as credible
by investors, capital markets, and private citizens. One way to make this
commitment credible is to entrench it in a constitution that comes with a set
of mechanisms that make it harder to renege on this commitment in the
future. Constitutions make it harder to renege on commitments because
they are difficult to amend, can be enforced by the judiciary, and generally
come with a set of coordination benefits that make it hard to ignore the
document altogether.10 In sum, the conventional wisdom purports to
explain both why states adopt protective takings clauses and why they
comply with them in practice.
This Essay next suggests two explanations for why the conventional
wisdom might not hold and why takings clauses might fail to constrain in
practice. First, countries could enshrine disingenuous promises in their
constitution to reap international benefits, such as improving their

7

The most comprehensive (qualitative) comparative survey on takings clauses in a set of
constitutions is provided by A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES (1999).
8
See infra Part II.A (introducing the data).
9
See infra Part I.
10
See infra Part I.A.
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international reputation or attracting foreign aid.11 They may even attempt
to attract investors based on such false promises. If so, we should expect
takings clauses to fail when adopted in the absence of genuine constraints,
and specifically, when there is no independent judiciary that can enforce
the constitution’s restrictions on the power of eminent domain. The
empirical analysis presented in this Essay lends no support for the thesis
that the effectiveness of takings clauses depends on the presence of an
independent judiciary.
A second reason for why takings clauses might fail to constrain in
practice is that a majority of citizens might believe that some degree of
expropriation benefits them more than a strong protection of private
property. 12 When this is the case, the constitutional commitment to protect
private property is not necessarily disingenuous but might be surrounded
by substantial societal disagreements. How such societal disagreements
will affect the takings clause’s future operation depends on the politics
surrounding its adoption. When those who favor some degree of
expropriation control the constitution-making process, it is likely that the
constitution will simply enshrine fewer restrictions on the power of
eminent domain. By contrast, when economic elites that benefit
disproportionally from secure property rights control the constitutionmaking process, these elites will adopt protective takings clauses that might
subsequently be undermined by future democratic politics.13 A last
possibility, explored at some length in this Essay, is that neither economic
elites nor popular majorities control the process entirely. As a result, the
competing interests of different societal groups will be built into the
constitution’s design. Indeed, this Essay shows that real-world
constitutional property regimes are riddled with ambiguities. Specifically,
some constitutions not only include a number of procedural and substantive
restrictions on the power of eminent domain in their takings clause, but also
include “fine print” that is typically separated from the main takings clause
but that nonetheless could be used to circumvent the guarantees in the main
takings clause. Examples of “fine print” include provisions that offer a
narrow definition of private property, policies that contemplate land
reform, provisions that restrict the property rights of foreigners, and clauses
that make private property subordinate to the common good.
This Essay finds that when accounting for takings clauses’ “fine
print,” that is, the ambiguities that are built into the constitution’s design,
constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain do appear to be
correlated with reduced de facto expropriation risks. In other words, only
11
12
13

See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.
See infra Part I.B.2.
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when the constitutional commitment to restrict the power of eminent
domain is unambiguous, stronger restrictions on the eminent domain power
are correlated with reduced expropriation risks. This finding suggests that
the effectiveness of constitutional takings clauses is to an important extent
determined by the politics surrounding their adoption.
This Essay unfolds as follows. Part I articulates the conventional
wisdom on why constitutional takings clauses matter as well as two reasons
for why this wisdom might not hold in practice. Part II introduces the
dataset on takings clauses, and documents cross-national variation in
takings clauses, including how they have developed over time. Part III
contrasts the de jure takings clauses with data on de facto expropriation
risks. Part IV explores whether takings clauses matter under some
circumstances only. Following the theories developed in Part I, Part IV
primarily explores “false positives,” that is, states that adopt takings clauses
either for entirely disingenuous reasons or in the face of substantial societal
disagreements over the desired level of expropriation.14 It also provides a
preliminary exploration of “false negatives,” that is, countries that respect
private property de jure but do not restrict the power of eminent domain de
facto. 15 The core empirical finding from Parts III and IV is that takings
clauses appear to have no impact in the aggregate but that they do appear to
matter when the constitution unambiguously commits to protect private
property and omits internal contradictions. Part IV concludes by describing
the limitations of the findings presented in this Essay and suggests future
directions for the comparative constitutional law literature.
I.

THE POLITICS OF TAKINGS CLAUSES: COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE

A. The Conventional Wisdom
It is widely accepted that protecting private property from arbitrary or
excessive expropriation contributes to long-term economic growth. 16 When
private property is secure from expropriation, citizens make more
productive use of their property, governments can more readily access
capital on capital markets, and investors are more likely to invest in the
country. 17 Consequently, for most societies, the long-term economic

14

I borrow this terminology from BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 17–18 (2009).
15
Id. Professors Law and Versteeg refer to false positives as “sham constitutions” and describe the
false negatives as “modest constitutions.” See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013) [hereinafter Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions].
16
See supra note 1.
17
See supra note 2.
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benefits that are associated with secure property rights will far outweigh the
short-term gains of expropriation.
Yet, the benefits associated with restrictions on the power of eminent
domain will materialize only when the restrictions against arbitrary or
excessive expropriation are credible.18 Capital markets, investors, and
private citizens are likely well aware of a potential time-inconsistency
problem that plagues government commitments to respect private property:
though governments appreciate the benefits of secure property rights in
theory, they might be tempted to renege on these promises once they are
put in place.19 Expropriation will be appealing when the state is short on
capital and the survival of the regime is at stake. 20 In such times, politicians
whose tenures depend on regular elections might discount the future value
of property protection and attempt to reap the short-term benefits of
expropriation even at the expense of long-term economic growth. Because
of these incentives, economic actors will invest only when they trust that
their investments will not be undermined by future government action.21
Constitutions have long been regarded as devices that can make
commitments credible.22 One of the fundamental goals of constitutionmaking is to solve the time–inconsistency problem that plagues many
government commitments. Constitutions are supposed to be the ropes that,
in Homer’s parable, bind Ulysses to the mast so that he can resist the
singing of the Sirens. 23 Constitutional theorists have proposed various
mechanisms that make it harder for a government to renege on its promises
and thus make constitutional commitments credible.24 First, the constitution
is the supreme authority of the legal system and is typically harder to
amend than ordinary legislation. 25 Second, the constitution’s rules and
18

See, e.g., Farber, supra note 6, at 88–89.
North & Weingast, supra note 1, at 806.
20
Id. at 807 (noting that the incentives to renege on commitments to protect private property ex
post are particularly large in times of crises, such as warfare, because at such times, the government is
likely to discount the future, and thus the long-term benefits associated with constitutional reform).
21
For example, as Professors North and Weingast showed in their study on seventeenth-century
England, the British crown was able to reap long-term economic benefits associated with secure
property rights only once it made its commitments credible by appointing Parliament as the key bearer
of the crown’s treasure chest. Id. at 804.
22
See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY (rev. ed. 1984) (likening constitutions to Ulysses ropes that help him to honor his
earlier commitment to resist the singing of the Sirens).
23
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 144–48 (Samuel Butler trans., 1998) (narrating the story of Ulysses and
the Sirens).
24
ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 38 (2009).
25
Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355,
360–65 (1994) (illustrating that constitutions are usually more difficult to amend than legislation); Mila
Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641,
1671–72 (2014) (describing amendment rates in the world’s constitutions and in state constitutions).
19
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principles are commonly guarded by a judicial body equipped with the
power to strike down laws and regulations that contradict these rules and
principles. 26 Third, the constitution helps a state to coordinate upon a set of
conventions by which it governs itself and that become harder to change
with time. 27 The very act of writing a constitution sets conventions that
clarify the rules by which different actors must play the political game. For
example, the constitution stipulates how many branches of government
there are, how they are elected and composed, and what they can and
cannot do with their power. Even though political actors might not value a
given constitutional rule, they do value the general notion of having rules,
which facilitate better government coordination. Because having
conventions is valuable in and of itself, it becomes harder to ignore the
parts of the constitution that are perceived as less desirable because doing
so would undermine the coordination benefits of the constitution as a
whole. 28 In sum, the constitution provides a range of mechanisms (such as
entrenchment, judicial review, and coordination) that make it harder to
deviate from those promises ex post, thereby serving as the metaphorical
ropes that tie a nation to its commitments. 29
Unlike Ulysses’s ropes, however, the constitutional protection
mechanisms are not fail-safe. A constitution can ultimately be amended,
courts ignored, and the rules of the game can be recoordinated.30 Each of
these, however, imposes substantial costs. Thus, even though a constitution
does not make it impossible for a government to renege on its
constitutional promises, it does raise the costs of doing so.
The costs of reneging on constitutional commitments are likely lower
when these commitments are countermajoritarian in nature. That is, when
26

See Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political
Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 3, 20
(Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
27
See RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82–85 (1999);
Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 51,
60 (Denis J. Galligan and Mila Versteeg eds., 2013) [hereinafter Hardin, Why] (noting it is “very
difficult to organize what would have to be a de facto collective action to topple a going convention”);
see also Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment,
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 659 (2011) (describing the coordination perspective); Kevin Cope & Mila
Versteeg, Constitutions, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES (James Wright ed., 2015) (noting that government needs coordination, just like “competitive
rowers, who must row in-sync to move the boat efficiently, or to automobile drivers, who must all drive
on the right (or left) to avoid logjam or collision”).
28
Hardin, Why, supra note 28, at 60.
29
Levinson, supra note 28, at 673–75 (“An oft-cited benefit of constitutionalism is that it enables
us to commit to normatively preferred policies in order to stand firm during moments when pathological
politics might undermine these policies.”).
30
See id., at 682–83 (suggesting that many social science theories on precommitment do not
actually explain why constitutional constraints endure in the future).
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constitutional commitments serve to protect minority interests against the
majority, majorities can fairly easily amend the constitution, appoint
sympathetic judges to the court, or use their political clout in some other
way to change the rules of the political game. Indeed, these scenarios were
precisely James Madison’s concern when he described the bill of rights as
nothing but “parchment barriers.”31 According to Madison, constitutions
can prevent the problem of “faction,” that is, minorities taking advantage of
the majority. 32 But Madison was more pessimistic about constitutions’
abilities to systematically protect minorities from majority rule.33 He feared
that when the majority wants to violate the minority’s rights, the
metaphorical ropes that tie a state to its earlier commitments would be
unbound. 34 Of course, it does not necessarily follow that
countermajoritarian constitutional constraints are meaningless altogether.
Even countermajoritarian constraints raise the costs of noncompliance. 35 As
Professor Hardin argues, people acquiesce even to unpopular constitutional
rules because they value having a set of conventions to conduct their
political affairs, and because coordinating upon an alternative set of rules is
costly. 36
In general, however, it will be more difficult to renege on
constitutional commitments that enjoy majority support. Although those in
power might at times be tempted to subvert the majority’s wishes, if these
wishes are enshrined in the constitution, then a number of constitutional
mechanisms might make it near-impossible to do so in fact. Courts are
likely staffed with judges who support the constitution’s protections, and
court decisions can act as “fire alarms” that set off political mobilization.37
Moreover, where constitutional commitments are majoritarian in nature,
proposed constitutional amendments will be voted down, and attempts to
31

THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 221 (James Madison) (Jim Manis ed., 2014).
Id. NO. 10, at 43–44 (James Madison).
33
Levinson, supra note 28, at 667 (noting that the bill of rights as originally conceived was “meant
not to protect against majoritarian tyranny . . . but, quite the opposite, to bolster majoritarian governance
by limiting the self-serving behavior of federal officials . . . ”).
34
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in DECLARING RIGHTS 160,
161 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1998) [hereinafter Madison Letter] (noting that “experience proves the
inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is most needed” and “[r]epeated
violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State”).
35
For an extended discussion, see Levinson, supra note 28.
36
Hardin, Why, supra note 28, at 60 (noting that even hated conventions are difficult to change,
and citing the potentially destabilizing nature of the American Electoral College, which remains
unchanged after the 2000 election). Madison, by contrast, ultimately came to believe that
countermajoritarian rights could work if the structural part of the constitution successfully induces
competition between different factions. See Levinson, supra note 28, at 668.
37
Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment Through Constitutionalization:
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 91, 100 (2000).
32

703

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

undermine the constitutional order will induce political opposition.38 Thus,
when constitutional constraints enjoy popular support, these constraints are
at their strongest.
Whether constitutional takings clauses are majoritarian in nature, and
are therefore most likely to remain effective over time, is a difficult
question. On the one hand, takings clauses could be seen as majoritarian
because they contribute to long-term economic growth, which benefits the
nation as a whole. Indeed, economists have shown that a lack of secure
property rights substantially hampers a country’s economic development.39
Conversely, constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain
improve economic growth and therefore can make the country as a whole
better off. 40 One way to view property clauses, therefore, is as majoritarian
in nature. On this view, we would expect that constitutional protections
against expropriation are particularly effective in constraining future
government action. On the other hand, viewing takings clauses as
majoritarian is also problematic because, in most societies, property is
unequally distributed, and a majority of people might believe that they
benefit more from expropriation than from the increased economic growth
associated with secure property rights. In that case, constitutional
protections against expropriation are likely to be undermined by democratic
politics, and will fail in practice. The next Part will explore in more detail
how the countermajoritarian characteristics of takings clauses might
undermine these clauses’ operation.
B. Revisiting the Conventional Wisdom: Disingenuous
and Halfhearted Promises
There are at least two scenarios under which takings clauses fail to
protect private property in practice. First, states might adopt takings clauses
in bad faith, making the procedural and substantive restrictions ostensibly
placed on the power of eminent domain mere deceptions. Second, states
might adopt takings clauses when they are only partially committed to
protect private property because different groups stand divided over the
extent to which the power of eminent domain ought to be curbed. In both
scenarios, the conventional wisdom would likely not hold, and the level of
de jure takings protections can be stronger on paper than in practice.
1. Disingenuous Promises.—One reason why restrictions on the
power of eminent domain could be stronger on paper than in practice is that
38
See Madison Letter, supra note 35, at 162 (describing rights “as a standard for trying the validity
of public acts, and a signal for rousing [and] uniting the superior force of the community”).
39
See supra note 1.
40
Id.
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some countries enshrine disingenuous promises into their constitutions. The
constitution of North Korea, for example, states that “[t]he State shall
protect private property and guarantee its legal inheritance.”41 In practice,
however, all property belongs to the state and people enjoy no private
property protections at all. 42
Disingenuous promises emerge when regimes want to avoid subjecting
themselves to any genuine constitutional constraints. For authoritarian
regimes, the benefits of evading constitutional constraints often outweigh
the economic benefits of protective takings clauses. 43 Authoritarian rules,
after all, do not necessarily seek to maximize general welfare, but rather
seek to secure their own grip on power. 44 Such regimes can either avoid
making any constitutional promises at all or adopt false constitutional
promises. 45 There are a number of reasons why they might choose the
latter. First, they could do so simply to bolster their international
reputation. 46 A body of sociological literature has demonstrated that the
international community is increasingly characterized by standardized
scripts of statehood, including standardized constitutional templates that
protect democracy, liberal values, and property rights. 47 A formal
constitution that includes the values and principles enshrined in this
standardized script has become a sign of modernity and a ticket for the
entry into “world society.” 48 By adopting such a constitution, states signal
conformity to the values of world society, and can improve their standing

41

JOSEON MINJUJUUI INMIN GONGHWAGUK SAHOEJUUI HEONBEOP [CONSTITUTION] (2012), art.
24 (N. Kor.).
42
See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 10 Reasons Countries Fall Apart, FOREIGN
POL’Y (June. 18, 2012), available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/10-reasons-countries-fallapart/ [http://perma.cc/832S-A8DT] (observing that “North Korea’s economic institutions make it
almost impossible for people to own property; the state owns everything, including nearly all land and
capital”).
43
But see TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 77–78, 229 (2007)
(describing how the Sadat regime in Egypt subjected itself to genuine constraints on the power of
eminent domain in order to attract foreign direct investment).
44
See Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction: Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes, in
CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 5–6 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2014)
(noting authoritarian constitutions often are used to facilitate elite coordination and cohesion).
45
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Constitutional Variation Among Strains of Authoritarianism, in
CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 165, 165–66 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds.,
2014) [hereinafter Law & Versteeg, Constitutional Variation] (suggesting that authoritarian
constitutions can either be brutally honest or sham).
46
Ginsburg & Simpser, supra note 45, at 6 (noting that constitutions in authoritarian regimes often
serve as “billboards” that display an attractive picture to the world).
47
John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 144–45 (1997)
(“Many features of the contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and
propagated through global cultural and associational processes.”).
48
See id., at 159.
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in the international community. 49 Thus, by conforming to international
norms against expropriation, states might reap benefits associated with an
improved international reputation.
A second reason why states might adopt facade takings clauses is to
attract bilateral and multilateral aid flows.50 Indeed, both foreign aid donors
and international financial institutions have often made their assistance
conditional upon respect for human rights, including property rights. 51 Aid
donors, moreover, have offered technical assistance for rule-of-law reforms
that include protective property regimes. 52 In both cases, the involvement of
aid donors might prompt drafters, acting in bad faith, to adopt protective
takings clauses to reap the benefits offered.
Finally, states could feature facade restrictions on the power of
eminent domain with the intent of luring foreign investors, only to later
expropriate the invested property. Foreign investment is characterized by
the so-called obsolescing bargain, which holds that investors are in a
dominant position ex ante when they are deciding on where to invest, but
that they lose this advantage after they have made their investment. 53
Therefore, if ill-intending states are able to attract investors with false
promises, these states will be in a strong position to expropriate them
afterwards. Of course, international investors are unlikely to be fooled so
easily. Investors devote substantial time and resources to assessing whether
their investments are secure, and they are likely to know when
governments are not genuinely committed to protecting private property.
But where promises are cheap, constitution-makers might consider it worth
a try.

49
Law & Versteeg, Constitutional Variation, supra note 46, at 170–71 (noting that authoritarian
regime might write liberal constitutions to gain acceptance from the international community); see also
B.S. Chimni, International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1, 15 (2004); Julian Go, A Globalizing Constitutionalism? Views from the Postcolony, 1945–
2000, 18 INT’L SOC. 71, 90 (2003); Meyer et al., supra note 48, at 153.
50
Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights, 39 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 1, 14 (2014) (finding empirically that countries that share common aid donors end up with
similar constitutional arrangements, and attributing this finding to pressure from the aid donors).
51
In the United States, for example, federal law prohibits the allocation of security assistance to
nations that engage in “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” See 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a)(2) (2012); see also Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and
Why?, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 33, 33–34 (2000); Eric Neumayer, Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded?
An Analysis of Total Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Flows, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 510, 526–27 (2003).
52
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 47 (2004).
53
RAYMOND VERNON, IN THE HURRICANE’S EYE: THE TROUBLED PROSPECTS OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 65 (1998) (drawing attention to the “obsolescing bargain,” which holds that investors are
in a dominant position ex ante, at the time host countries are persuading them to invest, but that they
lose this advantage ex post, and will therefore be cautious on when to invest).
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False promises can be detected by a conspicuous absence of real
enforcement mechanisms. 54 Accepting genuine constraints on the power of
eminent domain can be a dangerous strategy for regimes that seek to
govern without constraints. When doing so, they risk reducing their grip on
power because the constitutional mechanisms that curb eminent domain
could be turned against them in other areas as well. For example, when the
Sadat regime in Egypt made a conscious effort to attract foreign investment
by adopting a strong takings clause and establishing an independent
constitutional court to enforce it, the government was later forced to accept
court rulings that protected individual rights, 55 leading one commentator to
describe the Egyptian constitution as “a joke that turned serious.”56 For
those who want to govern without constraints, the more plausible strategy,
therefore, might be to adopt constitutions that promise rights, including
property rights, but do not offer any mechanisms to enforce these rights
against the government. 57
Perhaps the most important mechanism for enforcing the constitution’s
restrictions on the power of eminent domain is an independent judiciary
with the power of constitutional review. 58 Courts can strike down laws that
expropriate excessively, and they can act as a neutral arbiter in property
disputes between the government and private parties. 59 Investors have long
54

See supra Part I.A.
Tamir Moustafa, Law and Resistance in Authoritarian States: The Judicialization of Politics in
Egypt, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 132, 136–39 (Tom
Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) [hereinafter Moustafa, Law and Resistance].
56
Mona El-Ghobashy, Constitutional Contention in Contemporary Egypt, 51 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1590, 1598 (2008).
57
Walter F. Murphy, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 3, 8 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds.,
1993) (characterizing constitutions that exist for “cosmetic” purposes as “sham” constitutions, and
observing that “[t]he principal function of a sham constitutional text is to deceive”); A.E. Dick Howard,
A Traveler from an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance of Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 VA.
J. INT’L L. 3, 13 (2009) (dubbing the Soviet constitution of 1936 “a Potemkin Village, its provisions
meaning whatever the Party chose for them to mean”). See generally Law & Versteeg, Sham
Constitutions, supra note 16 (documenting constitutional noncompliance globally over the last three
decades).
58
Farber, supra note 6, at 87 (noting that judicial independence “suggests that the judiciary has the
necessary strength to enforce constitutional prohibitions against expropriation”); see also Stefan Voigt
& Jerg Gutmann, Turning Cheap Talk into Economic Growth: On the Relationship Between Property
Rights and Judicial Independence, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 66, 68 (2013) (“[A] factually independent
judiciary increases the credibility of government promises, including the promise to enforce property
rights.”); James Melton, Credibly Committing to Property Rights: The Roles of Reputation, Institutions,
and the Constitution 26 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctqjm0/Files/
melton_propertyrights.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZC5B-8GFF] (“[W]ithout a fair, efficient, and independent
judiciary that is constitutionally guaranteed, economic actors cannot be sure that their property is
safe.”).
59
Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from
Eighteenth Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
55
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accepted the notion that an independent judiciary is crucial for the
protection of property rights from government expropriation. As one study
from the 1970s notes:
The presence of a strong, independent, and competent judiciary can be
interpreted as an indicator of a low propensity to expropriate. If this judicial
system is strong, independent, and competent, it will be less likely to ‘rubber
stamp’ the legality of an expropriation and more likely to accede to a standard
of fair compensation. The effect of this would be to lower the propensity of
the host nation government to expropriate. 60

This insight suggests that when states adopt constitutional takings
clauses in the absence of an independent judiciary that can enforce these
clauses, their commitment to protect private property might be
disingenuous. Thus, in countries that purport to constitutionally restrict the
power of eminent domain, the absence of an independent judiciary is a red
flag. 61
2. Halfhearted Promises: Faction and Disagreement.—Another
possible explanation for why eminent domain restrictions might be stronger
on paper than in practice is that the restrictions enjoy only partial popular
support. That is, the promise to respect private property is not entirely
disingenuous, but it lacks support from important segments of society.
Although curbing the power of eminent domain can make society as a
whole better off, takings clauses are hardly majoritarian when the benefits
of constitutional restrictions on eminent domain fall disproportionally upon
economic elites. In general, restrictions on the power of eminent domain
disproportionally benefit those who possess more property. Moreover,
these same economic elites might also receive a disproportionate share of
the increased economic welfare flowing from secure property rights. When
wealth is unequally distributed, a majority of citizens might benefit more
from expropriation than from the long-term economic benefits associated
with secure property rights. For the bottom part of the income earners,
expropriation will be appealing when they expect that only a small part of
the future gains will come their way, because they discount the future, or
both. Regardless of their exact motivations, competing preferences for the
desired level of property protection likely affect the operation of the takings
clause in practice.
60

MOUSTAFA, supra note 44, at 69 (quoting J. FREDERICK TRUITT, EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 44–45 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61
Another red flag might be authoritarianism as such, yet authoritarian leaders do sometimes
credibly commit to private property, as the Egyptian case suggest. The focus of the empirical analysis in
Parts III and IV will therefore be on judicial independence, while controlling for democracy. See also
note 133 supra for a further discussion of the possible impact of democracy.
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How different preferences for restricting eminent domain affect the
takings clause’s operation likely depends on the circumstances surrounding
its adoption. Where democratic majorities with a preference for some
degree of expropriation dominate the constitution-making process, the
constitution might simply enshrine fewer restrictions on the power of
eminent domain. To illustrate, the drafters of the 1983 Canadian Charter
decided to omit a takings clause altogether for fear of replicating the
American Lochner experience. 62 Indeed, there exists substantial crosscountry variation in the strength of the restrictions placed on the power of
eminent domain. 63 These constitutional differences presumably reflect how
different constitution-makers balance the importance of private property
against other values. Thus, where a portion of the population favors
restricting the power of eminent domain, and this group is influential in the
constitution-making process, the constitution will simply enshrine fewer de
jure restrictions on the power of eminent domain.
By contrast, when the constitution-making process is dominated by
economic elites who value secure property rights more than popular
majorities do, this might result in a situation in which restrictions on the
power of eminent domain are stronger on paper than in practice. According
to a body of literature, constitutions often serve as tools for elites to
insulate their policy preferences from future democratic decisionmaking. 64
Professor Hirschl has found that economic elites who anticipate losing
power will constitutionally entrench strong property rights to protect their
property from future expropriation by democratic majorities.65 Likewise,
historian Charles Beard has famously argued that the desire to preserve
wealth and privilege was the guiding rationale behind the U.S.
Constitution, which, he says, largely protected the economic interests of the
wealthy. 66
62
Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1, 3–
5 (2004) (suggesting that the Canadians wanted to avoid the American Lochner experience, whereby
“the U.S. Supreme Court struck down close to two hundred state and federal laws” that infringed upon
economic freedom and private contract).
63
See infra Part II.
64
For an overview of this literature, see Ran Hirschl, The Strategic Foundations of Constitutions,
in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 157, 169 (Denis Galligan & Mila
Versteeg eds., 2013) [hereinafter Hirschl, Strategic Foundations].
65
See generally HIRSCHL, supra note 53, at 49 (observing that “[e]conomic elites may therefore
view the constitutionalization of rights, especially property, mobility, and occupational rights, as a
means of . . . fighting what their members often perceive to be harmful large-government policies of an
encroaching state”).
66
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 164, 303 (Transaction Publishers 1998) (1913) (arguing that the “real nature” of the fight over
the ratification of the Constitution was between the “natural aristocracy” and common people
representing “turbulent democracy” and that “the protection of property rights lay at the basis of the
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If a constitution disproportionally reflects the interests of economic
elites, its restrictions on eminent domain are unlikely to align with
majoritarian preferences. As a result, the various mechanisms designed to
keep a government to its constitutional promises might break down.
Democratic majorities can use their political clout to undermine the takings
clause in different ways. 67 To illustrate, in the United States, President
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan forced the Court to adhere more closely to
democratic preferences on property protection. 68 Likewise, the Indian
Supreme Court backed down from protecting property against social
welfare legislation after a two-decade long battle with the Indian legislature
in which the Indian legislature kept passing constitutional amendments to
overturn Supreme Court decisions. 69 Where such ideological shifts take
place, the country will either move to a lower level of property protection
de jure (through amending the constitution) or offer stronger property
protections on paper than in practice.
Another possibility is that neither popular majorities nor elites
dominate the constitution-making process entirely and that the competing
preferences of different groups are built into the constitution’s design. That
is, the constitution simultaneously reflects both the values of economic
elites that favor strong restrictions on eminent domain and those of popular
majorities that want to carve out exceptions to these restrictions. The
resulting constitution has built-in contradictions and ambiguities that allow
it to be interpreted different ways, depending on how the political
landscape changes after the constitution is ratified.
The use of contradictory provisions, or strategic ambiguities, has been
documented in different areas of constitutional law. Professors Bali and
Lerner document this phenomenon with respect to religion: Constitutionmakers enshrine contradictory religion clauses when different religious

new system”). But see FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 398 (Transaction Publishers 1992) (1958) (arguing that those economically affected by
the Constitution had a wide variety competing interests and so “[i]t is therefore not even theoretically
possible to devise a single set of alignments on the issue of ratification that would explain the contest as
one in which economic self-interest was the principal motivating force”).
67
Majorities may push for constitutional amendments and reduce de jure takings protections. In
that case, however, we should not expect a disconnect between de jure and de facto property
protections.
68
MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE
COURT-PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 419–22 (2002); James W. Ely, Jr., Property Rights and Democracy
in the American Constitutional Order, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 487, 506 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T.
McGuire eds. 2005) (describing President Roosevelt’s court packing plan and noting that “this change
of direction had a profound impact on the judicial protection of property rights. The Supreme Court
now deferred to legislative judgments about economic policy and largely abandoned its historical
dedication to the sanctity of private property and contractual arrangements”).
69
For an overview, see VAN DER WALT, supra note 7, at 192–206.
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groups stand divided over the appropriate role for religion in society. 70
They note that “[p]articularly in cases where the constitutional status of
religious law was an important axis of debate, the outcome documents
frequently embraced two approaches often considered to be mutually
exclusive in the comparative constitutional literature.” 71 In a recent study,
Professor Negretto documents a similar phenomenon for electoral rules in
Latin American constitutions. 72 He notes that, as the democratic coalitions
that write and revise constitutions have become more inclusive,
constitutions have witnessed the adoption of electoral rules that improve
the democratic responsiveness of government officials. 73 At the same time,
dominant groups within these coalitions have often been able to use their
power to expand executive power, resulting in contradictory constitutional
designs that simultaneously enhance democratic responsiveness and expand
executive power. 74
In the same vein, Professor Lombardi has suggested that constitutions
can incorporate strategic ambiguities to accommodate the competing
ideologies of different societal groups in a single document. 75 Lombardi
illustrates his claim in the context of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, which
contained religious, libertarian, and authoritarian provisions that were in
direct tension with each other and that reflected the diverging values and
interests of competing groups. Lombardi observes that the constitution
“reflected considerable confusion about the nature of the state and the
ideology of its governing institutions,” allowing one to imagine the state in
radically different ways: Pan-Arabist or Egyptian Nationalist, socialist or
capitalist, and secular or Islamic. 76 These ambiguities made it possible for
warring factions to reach consensus because each faction believed that the
constitution could protect their ideology if they were to hold power in the

70
Asli Bali & Hanna Lerner, Religion in Constitution-Writing: A Theoretical Framework (2014)
(unpublished draft) (on file with authors). See also HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN
DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 7 (2013) (describing “incrementalism” as a constitutional design strategy
for religiously divided societies, which includes the use of “ambiguous legal language” and “inserting
internally contradictory provisions in the constitution”).
71
Id. at 5.
72
GABRIEL L. NEGRETTO, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS: PRESIDENTS, PARTIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHOICE IN LATIN AMERICA 43–69 (2013).
73
Id. at 9.
74
Id. at 2.
75
Clark B. Lombardi, The Constitution as an Agreement to Agree: The Social and Political
Foundations (and Effects) of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 398, 398–99, 426 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013).
76
Id. at 398.
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future. 77 Indeed, the observation that societal disagreements might render
constitutions internally inconsistent traces back at least to Carl Schmitt’s
notion of the dilatorischer Formelkompromiss (“disingenuous
compromise”), which produces a constitution that, in Schmitt’s words,
“satisfies all contradictory demands and leaves, in an ambiguous turn of
phrase, the actual points of controversy undecided,” and therefore provides
nothing but a “semantic jumble of substantively irreconcilable matters.” 78
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that the politics surrounding private
property render constitutional property regimes similarly ambiguous. As
subsequent parts of this Essay elaborate, constitutions are often riddled
with contradictions when it comes to property protections. To illustrate,
several constitutions establish a very narrow meaning of “private property”
that the nominally robust takings clause protects.79 Other constitutions
enshrine a strong takings clause in the bill of rights, but include a separate
section on state policies, which curtails property rights in the name of land
reform or urban planning. 80 Still others make sweeping claims that private
property should serve a social purpose, or they subject foreign citizens to
different property rights regimes. 81 In many cases, these contrary provisions
are not enshrined in the bill of rights but in various other parts of the
constitution, such as a section on government policies or general
principles. 82 And perhaps even more surprisingly, these contrary provisions
are found especially in constitutions that place strong restrictions on the
power of eminent domain in their main takings clause. In other words, the

77

See id.; see also Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in
Constitutional Design, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 650 (2011) (offering a related account of why
constitution-makers often defer decisions on contested issues through the use of “by law” clauses).
78
CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 84–85 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., Duke Univ. Press
2008) (1928). I thank Ulrich Pruess for pointing me to Carl Schmitt on this point.
79
See, e.g., LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 24, 1976, art. 22.
(“The personal ownership of earnings and savings derived from one’s own work, of the dwelling which
one possess with legal title of and of the other goods and objects which serve to satisfy the material and
cultural needs of the person, is guaranteed.”).
80
For example, although article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution guarantees everyone the right to
property and requires that “the law shall establish procedures for expropriation for public necessity or
public use, or for social interest, upon just and prior compensation in cash,” article 182 of the same
states that “[u]rban property performs its social function when it conforms to the fundamental
requirements for the city’s ordering expressed in the master plan.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.]
[CONSTITUTION] arts. 5, 182 (Braz.).
81
See, e.g., LA CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE D’HAÏTI [CONSTITUTION] May 9, 2011 & June
19, 2012, arts. 55, 55.1 (Haiti) (“The right to own real property is accorded to aliens resident in Haiti for
the needs of their sojourn in the country. . . . However, aliens residing in Haiti may not own more than
one dwelling in the same Arrondissement. They may in no case engage in the business of renting real
estate.”).
82
See, e.g., CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR [CONSTITUTION] Dec.
20, 1983, arts. 22, 105 (El Sal.).
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stronger the protections in the main takings clause, the higher the
probability that contrary provisions will appear in other parts of the
constitution. 83 These contrary provisions thus act as fine print that should
alert the careful reader that different parts of society were unable to agree
on the desired level of property protection.
Where such ambiguities are built into the constitution’s design, the
constitution sends a mixed message: it both promises not to expropriate
while including provisions to undermine the same. How these contrary
provisions will affect the operation of the takings clause in practice likely
depends on future political coalitions and their preferences. Where
majorities prevail, and they benefit insufficiently from the economic
benefits associated with secure property rights, it is likely that the fine print
provisions will swallow the protections enshrined in the main takings
clause. By contrast, where elites govern or majorities do value the longterm economic benefits associated with secure property rights, the
restrictions will prevail over the exceptions. Although both are plausible in
theory, the empirical findings in the next Part of this Essay demonstrate
that in the face of constitutional contradictions, the exceptions become the
rule. 84
II. TAKINGS CLAUSES IN THE WORLD’S CONSTITUTIONS
Takings clauses have become a near-universal ingredient of the
world’s constitutions. Today, no less than 94% of all constitutions include a
takings clause. 85 Constitutional takings clauses do not prohibit
expropriation altogether, but rather define and limit the circumstances
under which a government can expropriate, thereby reducing the
arbitrariness of expropriation. Substantial variation exists in the kind and
number of restrictions that are placed on the power of eminent domain.
Specifically, takings clauses differ from each other in the amount of
compensation they require, when compensation ought to be paid, the
circumstances under which expropriation is allowed, and the procedural
guarantees that must be followed. Such differences presumably reflect
differences in the composition and preferences of constitution-makers in
different countries. 86 As a result of these differences, some constitutions

83

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
85
See infra Part II.A (introducing the data).
86
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, at
ix (1985) (noting that social welfare requires some limitations on private property because “the claims
of individual autonomy must be tempered by the frictions that pervade everyday life . . . . Autonomy
must be protected by supplying an equivalent of what is lost, but it is not protected absolutely”).
84
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ultimately provide stronger protections against expropriation than others.
The remainder of this Part will explore and document this variation.
A. Variation in Takings Clauses
The empirical exploration of constitutional takings clauses is made
possible by an original dataset on property protections in national
constitutions from 1946 to 2013. This data was collected as part of a larger
database on the world’s constitutions. Specifically, for each constitution
written since 1946, the author hand-coded 237 variables that capture rights,
rights-related policies, and their enforcement. The database takes account
of the amendment and replacement of constitutions, thus tracking changes
in the prevalence of these 237 constitutional features over time. This
general dataset contains seventeen variables relating to constitutional
property rights, which are used in this paper. 87 The coding of national
constitutions, of course, requires a range of decisions on what constitutes a
constitution, as well as a range of decisions on how to code each
constitution. The coding protocol for the database is documented in greater
detail in the author’s earlier work. 88
A potential shortcoming of this data is that it only captures the text of
the constitution and excludes judicial interpretations of the text. In theory,
some of the substantive and procedural restrictions on the power of eminent
domain that help nations credibly commit to respect private property might
be found in judicial interpretations, rather than in the text of the
constitution itself. Most countries, however, set out their constitutional
property regime in great detail.89 One likely motivation for doing so is to
limit judicial discretion in interpreting such provisions. Another motivation
is that explicit constitutional protections send a stronger and clearer signal
to foreign investors that their property is protected.90 Although investors
could potentially consult judicial decisions, these are less visible, less
accessible, and more easily overturned. As a result, we may expect that, in
most cases, the explicit textual limitations on the eminent domain power
are a fairly accurate representation of the constitutional limitations on
expropriation. The remainder of this Part will explore the various explicit
constitutional restrictions that states have placed on the power of eminent
domain.
87

The 1946–2006 portion of the data was collected as part of the author’s dissertation. The 2006–
2013 portion of the data was collected with the excellent assistance of Sean Roberts at the University of
Virginia School of Law.
88
See Law & Versteeg, Constitutional Variation, supra note 46.
89
Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 26, at 1703 (noting that foreign constitutions are generally more
detailed than the U.S. Constitution).
90
See, e.g., Farber, supra note 6, at 88–91.
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B. Compensation Requirement
A substantial portion of the world’s constitutions require the
government to compensate expropriated property. What constitutes the
optimal level of compensation for expropriation is the subject of a
voluminous literature in law and economics. 91 The basic premise of this
literature is that if the required level of compensation is too low, the
government will expropriate more than is socially optimal, and if the level
of compensation is too high, the government will expropriate less than
what is socially optimal. The extensive literature notwithstanding, there
appears to be little scholarly consensus on the optimal level of
compensation.92 Also the world’s constitutions vary in the amount of
compensation they demand. Some takings clauses do not require any
compensation at all, 93 while others require the government to pay
compensation but do not specify how much compensation ought to be
paid. 94 Takings clauses that do specify the level of compensation roughly
fall into two categories: (1) those that explicitly require either “full
compensation” or “market value” compensation, and (2) those that use
more ambiguous language such as “fair,” “adequate,” or “equitable”
compensation.
The drafting of the 1994 South African interim constitution illustrates
the stakes of this choice. In the negotiations over the takings clause, the
National Party that had governed the country under apartheid wanted to
enshrine a requirement of full market value compensation in the takings
clause, to protect the property interest of their wealthy constituents. By
contrast, the African National Party, representing the majority of blacks
that had suffered repression under the apartheid regime, wanted the takings

91
YUN-CHIEN CHANG, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TAKINGS COMPENSATION: THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 3–13 (2013) (discussing different types of compensation
schemes advocated in literature, such as zero compensation, current value compensation, fair market
value compensation, economic value compensation, and project value compensation).
92
Some scholars propose lower, even zero, compensation as optimal. See, e.g., Lawrence Blume &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 569 (1984);
Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of Land: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984). Others argue for a fuller compensation. See, e.g.,
Thomas J. Miceli, Compensation for the Taking of Land Under Eminent Domain, 147 J. INST. &
THEOR. ECON. 354 (1991); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749 (1994).
93
See QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], art. 22.
94
See Art. 42 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.).
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clause to merely require “equitable” compensation, presumably to ease the
redistribution of wealth to their constituents in the future. 95
Figure 1 depicts the prevalence of each of these options. It shows that
the majority of constitutions demand compensation, but use ambiguous
language on how much compensation is required. As of 2013, 62.7% of all
constitutions with a takings clause opt for this approach. The number of
constitutions that unambiguously require full or market value compensation
is much lower, although they have been increasing in number since the
1990s. Today, 15.3% of all constitutions with a takings clause require full
or market value compensation.
FIGURE 1: LEVEL OF COMPENSATION REQUIRED BY CONSTITUTION

C. Timeliness of Compensation
Takings clauses not only differ in how much compensation they
require, but also differ in when they require compensation to be paid.
Specifically, among the takings clauses that demand compensation,
constitution-makers have opted for various approaches: (1) some require
compensation to be paid prior to expropriation, (2) some require
compensation to be paid promptly or within reasonable time after
expropriation, and (3) some do not impose a timeliness requirement at all.
Presumably, constitution-makers that add language requiring prior
compensation favor stronger protection of property rights than those who
95
Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Codes 10 (UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2014-37),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482377 [http://perma.cc/L3FLDZPV].
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require prompt compensation or omit a timeliness requirement altogether.
Figure 2 depicts the prevalence of each of these three options among
the constitutions that stipulate a compensation requirement. It reveals that
most constitutions do not include a timeliness requirement for
compensation. Perhaps most strikingly, the percentage of constitutions that
require prior compensation has decreased over time, from about 56.5% in
1946 to 31.6% today. By contrast, the number of countries that require
prompt compensation has increased since the 1960s, so that, today, 20.3%
of all constitutions that include a compensation requirement demand
prompt compensation.
FIGURE 2: TIMELINESS OF COMPENSATION

D. Due Process Requirement
Takings clauses also vary in whether they include a due process
requirement, that is, a requirement that certain procedures are followed in
order to expropriate property. Such a due process requirement can take
different forms. Some constitutions require that expropriation be done by
law, 96 while others state that nobody should be deprived of property
“without due process of law,” 97 or that expropriation should be done on

96

Art. 17, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.) (“Property may not be violated, and no
inhabitant of the Nation can be deprived of it except by virtue of a sentence based on law. Expropriation
for reasons of public interest must be authorized by law and previously compensated.”).
97
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO Aug. 1, 1976, § 4 (“[T]he right
of the individual to life, liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property and the right not to be
deprived thereof except by due process of law.”).
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“just terms.” 98 Figure 3 reveals that most takings clauses have always
included some version of a due process requirement. Currently, 90.4% of
all constitutions with a takings clause include such a requirement and the
prevalence of this requirement has been similar in past decades.
Some constitutions not only include a general due process guarantee,
but also explicitly demand judicial involvement in expropriation. By doing
so, constitution-makers ensure the involvement of a neutral and
independent arbiter in disputes between the government and private
property holders, thus making it harder for the government to expropriate
arbitrarily. Figure 3 reveals that currently 36.7% of all constitutions with a
takings clause explicitly require judicial involvement in expropriation, and
that this number has steadily increased over time.
FIGURE 3: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS WITH EXPROPRIATIONS
INCLUDING JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT

E. Public Interest Requirement
Many constitutions that contain a takings clause not only require the
government to follow certain procedural requirements, but also place
substantive limitations on the conditions under which the government can
expropriate, by requiring that expropriation serves a public interest. Such
substantive restrictions on expropriation arguably make it harder to
expropriate.
98

AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51 (“The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or
person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws . . . .”).
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Figure 4 depicts the percentage of countries whose takings clause
stipulates a public interest requirement. It reveals that constitutions
commonly require expropriation to serve the public interest. Notably, the
graph also reveals that the prevalence of public interest guarantees
decreased in the 1970s and 1980, but increased again in the 1990s.99 Today,
85.9% of all constitutions with a takings clause include a public interest
requirement.
FIGURE 4: PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIREMENT WITH EXPROPRIATION

F. Towards an Expropriation Index
Some takings clauses offer stronger procedural and substantive
protections against expropriation than others. To capture the extent to
which any given constitution protects against expropriation, the variables
discussed above can be combined into a single expropriation index.
Specifically, a country receives the value of 0 if it does not have a takings
clause, or when it does not provide any of the substantive or procedural
limits on takings discussed above. Countries receive one additional point
when:
•
•

The takings clause requires compensation.
The takings clause requires “full” or “market value”

99
The declining popularity of these requirements in the 1970s and 1980s might reflect the
nationalization movement during this period, while the increase in the 1990s presumably reflects the
wave of neo-liberal constitutional reforms at this time.
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•
•
•
•
•

compensation.
The takings clause requires timely compensation.
The takings clause requires prior compensation.
The takings clause contains a due process requirement.
The takings clause requires judicial involvement
expropriation.
The takings clause includes a public interest requirement.

in

The resulting additive scale is based on the assumption that each of
these individual components are desirable from an investor’s perspective
and that the constitutional adoption of more of the features listed above
makes private property more secure from government intervention. At the
same time, it does not assume that some provisions serve as a precondition
for the fulfillment of other provisions, or that without some of these
provisions property rights would be undermined entirely. The resulting
additive scale ranges from 0 to 7. It has a scale reliability coefficient of
0.78 (“Cronbach’s alpha”), which means that the correlation between this
scale and all other possible seven-point scales that could be constructed
from the same components is 0.78. 100
Figure 5 depicts the 2013 scores for all countries on a world map. A
cursory glance at the world map suggests that some of the countries with
the highest levels of property protections on paper are not necessarily those
that are most respectful of private property in practice. The top three most
protective constitutions in 2013 are those of Armenia, Greece, and Peru, all
of which have a mediocre track record of respecting private property in
practice.

100
ROBERT F. DEVELLIS, SCALE DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 109 (3d ed. 2012)
(describing an alpha coefficient between 0.70 and 0.80 as “respectable”). A different way to construct
this index is through factor analysis. Specifically, when performing common factor analysis with an
orthogonal rotation, it turns out that one latent factor explains about 79% of the shared variation of the
various items in the scale. Both the scree elbow test and the Kaiser test moreover suggest that only one
factor should be retained. Id. at 128–32. When using factor scores on the first factor instead of the
additive scale in the analysis reported below, the results remain similar. The remainder of this Essay
will use the additive scale in the primary analysis because it is easier to interpret. See note 124 supra for
a discussion of the results when using factor scores instead of the additive scale.
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FIGURE 5: WORLD MAP (2013)

G. Fine Print
Some constitutions enshrine provisions that contradict the procedural
and substantive guarantees against expropriation included in the main
takings clause. Specifically, some constitutions include “fine print” that is
typically separated from the main takings clause, but that nonetheless could
be used to circumvent the guarantees in the main takings clause.
To a careful reader, a number of provisions might stand out as red
flags that suggest that constitution-makers carved out exceptions to the
main takings clause. These provisions serve as fine print to the main
takings clause. Although there is no single way to draft fine print, there are
some fairly standard provisions that appear in multiple constitutions and
that lend themselves to quantitative coding.
Particularly suspicious are the provisions that define different property
types (such as communal and public property, in addition to private
property) and essentially provide a narrow definition of the private property
protected by the takings clause. These provisions are typically found in a
section with general principles and policies and not the bill of rights itself,
and are thus separated from the main takings clause. Also suspicious are
provisions that place various restrictions on landownership or that
contemplate land reform. To a careful reader, these provisions reveal that
land titles might be less secure than the general takings clause suggests.
Policies related to land reform are usually not part of the bill of rights, but
are typically placed in a section that sets forth principles for state policy.
Another category of suspicious provisions comprises those that provide a
separate property regime for foreigners. These provisions do not deprive
foreigners of their property entirely, but subject them to a different legal
regime that could make them more vulnerable to expropriation. The
constitutional arrangements for foreigners, again, are not usually placed in
the bill of rights but in a section on government policy.
Potentially also suspicious are limitations clauses that state that
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property should serve the common good. These provisions are different
from the public interest requirement discussed in Part II.A in that they do
not require that expropriation should serve a public interest, but rather
make a sweeping statement that all property is subordinate to the public
good. These clauses therefore have the potential to undermine property
protections entirely: whenever a government declares something to serve
the common good, private property can be curtailed. These statements,
however, are fairly common: today, they are enshrined in about one-third
of all constitutions with a takings clause. What is more, these statements
are usually included in the takings clause itself, making it more difficult to
regard them as “fine print” that was added to the constitution to undermine
the main takings clause. For these reasons, the common good clauses are
not classified as “fine print,” at least not for the initial exploration of the
data.101
Another design feature for which it is unclear whether or not to treat it
as fine print is the location of the main takings clause. Specifically,
although most constitutions include the takings clause in the bill of rights,
some place it in a different part of their constitution, such as the preamble.
On the one hand, placing the takings clause outside the bill of rights could
make it easier for states to circumvent the takings clause, as usually only
the rights enshrined in the bill of rights are subject to judicial review. On
the other hand, a number of countries place all constitutional rights in their
preamble, making it difficult to predict whether this is indeed a strategy to
circumvent the takings clause. For this reason, the location of takings
clauses is not treated as fine print, at least not for the initial exploration of
the data. Notably, the findings presented in the next Part do not depend on
these classification decisions and they remain similar when reclassifying
either or both of these features (that is, the common good clause and the
location of the takings clause) as fine print.102
Figure 6 depicts the prevalence of each of the main fine print
provisions: (1) different types of property, (2) land restrictions, (3) land
reform, and (4) a separate property regimes for foreigners. It reveals that
none of these provisions are very common, and that most appear in
somewhere between 10% and 20% of all constitutions. Notably, many of
the constitutions that include fine print include more than one of these
provisions at once. The graph also reveals an upward trajectory for all
features from the 1960s to the 1980s, with the fine provisions reaching the
height of their popularity in the late 1980s, and revealing a decline in their
101

Instead, these clauses are treated as ordinary limitation clauses. See Law & Versteeg, Sham
Constitutions, supra note 16, at 933 (showing empirically that constitutional rights almost universally
come with limitations clauses).
102
See infra Part IV.A.
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prevalence from the 1990s onwards. This trajectory suggests that the fine
print provisions are linked to the rise and fall of socialist constitutions. At
the same time, the enduring prevalence of such provisions up till this date
suggests that they are not simply a feature of socialist systems but
withstood the “end of history,” 103 and remain prevalent in the constitutions
of purportedly free market economies today.
FIGURE 6: TAKINGS CLAUSES’ FINE PRINT

It is noteworthy that fine print provisions are often accompanied by a
generous takings clause. Indeed, among the countries that include one or
more of the fine print provisions identified above, the average score on the
expropriation index is above the global average. Over the course of the
period 1946–2013, the average score on the expropriation index was 3.21.
Among countries with fine print provisions in their constitution, by
contrast, it was 3.31, while among countries without fine print it was
3.16. 104 This suggests that these provisions reflect genuine contradictions in
the constitution’s design.
III. FROM DE JURE TO DE FACTO
A comparison of how takings clauses measure up with actual respect
for property rights requires data on de facto expropriation risks in each
country. A commonly used measure to capture de facto respect for private
103
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, at xi (2006) (arguing that
the fall of socialism and the triumph of liberal democracy in the 1990s marked “the end of history”).
104
A t-test suggests that this difference in means is statistically significant at the 5% level.
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property is the “risk of expropriation index” from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG). 105 The ICRG is prepared by the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group, which is a commercial provider of political and country risks
forecasts to international investors. 106 The ICRG consists of a range of
variables that capture monthly information on the political, economic, and
financial risks associated with investing in any given country. It is
compiled by a team of country analysts that draw on a range of different
sources. 107 Importantly, the ICRG assesses actual investment risks in a
country and not constitutional takings clauses. This study uses the ICRG
variable that specifically captures the risks of expropriation, and that does
not include other types of political risks faced by investors. This variable is
based on an expert assessment of how secure private property is from
government intervention. 108 It ranges from zero to ten, with zero indicating
the lowest level of protection against government expropriation.
A cursory exploration of the data suggests that there is virtually no
relationship between the de jure expropriation index and the de facto risk of
expropriation. The correlation coefficient between the two variables
is -0.028, which suggests that the two measures are largely unrelated, and
105

The risk of expropriation index is also used by Acemoglu et al., Colonial Origins, supra note 1,
at 1370, and Acemoglu & Johnson, supra note 5, at 958. A number of studies also include other ICRG
variables (such as rule of law, and quality of the bureaucracy or corruption) to capture the protection of
property rights. See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance:
Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (1995); Keefer &
Knack, supra note 1; Melton, supra note 59. Such an approach, however, seems imprecise and
overinclusive, especially since the ICRG provides data on the risk of expropriation specifically. Another
possible measure is the private property index constructed by the Heritage Foundation. However, this
measure not only captures the risk of expropriation by the government, but also captures the degree to
which property is secure in the relationships and transactions between private actors. See Acemoglu &
Johnson, supra note 5, at 958. This measure is therefore less appropriate for my purposes.
106
I thank Michael Burke from the Political Risk Services Group for answering my numerous
questions on the International Country Risk Guide’s risk of expropriation data.
107
See The PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide, https://www.prsgroup.com/about-us/
our-two-methodologies/icrg [https://perma.cc/ZLU6-KDEZ]. This data is used, among others, in
Acemoglu & Johnson, supra note 5, at 958; Thorsten Beck et al., Law, Endowments, and Finance, 70 J.
FIN. ECON. 137, 138 (2003); Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3
(2002); and Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222, 222 (1999).
108
Note that this is specifically coded as risks of expropriation of investors’ property, but this is
likely to be highly correlated with property in general. Indeed prior studies use the index to measure
property rights in general rather than investors’ property rights specifically. See, e.g., Acemoglu et al.,
Colonial Origins, supra note 1. The ICRG provides investment risks on a monthly basis. I create an
annual expropriation risk measure by taking the average of the monthly data. The PRS Group changed
its methodology for creating the expropriation risk variable in the late 1990s. At that point, the
expropriation risks variable was renamed to “contract viability,” and broadened in scope to include the
viability of contracts with the government in addition to risk of expropriation. The original variable
covers the period of 1984–1997, while the new variable is available from 2001 to 2013. The following
analysis accounts for the difference in data collection by including a post-1997 dummy variable that
controls for changes in coding methodology.
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that, if anything, their relationship is negative, meaning that a higher score
on the de jure expropriation index is associated lower de facto protection
against government expropriation. Figure 7 plots the de jure and de facto
scores for the year 2013. The horizontal and vertical lines denote the
average de jure and de facto scores in this year, while the dashed trend line
reveals a negative but weak relationship between de jure and de facto
protections (the correlation coefficient for 2013 is -0.21).
A substantial number of countries are clustered in the top left quadrant
of Figure 7, meaning that they place stronger restrictions on the power of
eminent domain on paper than in practice. These are the countries that
might have adopted takings clauses for disingenuous reasons or where the
adoption of takings clauses was surrounded by substantial societal
disagreements. Another group of countries, however, is clustered in the
bottom right quadrant, suggesting that these countries protect property de
facto even though they place only few constitutional restrictions on the
power of eminent domain. Although the theoretical discussion thus far has
focused mainly on the first group (the “false positives,” that is, countries
that offer higher levels of protection on paper than in practice) the
empirical analysis in Part IV.B will provide a preliminary exploration of
the second group (the “false negatives,” that is, countries that offer higher
levels of protection in practice than on paper).
Of course, this simple graph does not take account of other
determinants of expropriation that might be correlated with the
constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain. Regression
analysis is used to control for such confounding factors. Even with
regression analysis, causal questions on the impact of constitutional
protections are “notoriously complex and difficult to resolve.” 109 To know
that takings clauses are related to de facto expropriation risks does not
necessarily indicate whether takings clauses actually influence de facto
expropriation risks or are merely correlated with them. 110 Nevertheless,
correlations can shed light upon the plausibility of certain hypotheses and
inform subsequent interpretations on whether takings clauses matter.111
Conversely, a lack of statistically significant correlation between
constitutional takings clauses and de facto expropriation risks suggests that
it is unlikely that they are related.

109
Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 16, at 919; see also Anne Meuwese & Mila
Versteeg, Quantitative Methods for Comparative Constitutional Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN
COMPARATIVE LAW 230, 233 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (discussing the difficulty
of distinguishing correlation from causation).
110
See Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 16, at 919.
111
Id.
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FIGURE 7: SCATTER PLOT DE JURE AND DE FACTO FOR 2-13

112

To explore the relationship between de jure takings clauses and de
facto expropriation risks, I estimate a simple linear regression model with
robust standard errors clustered at the country level, 113 country fixedeffects, and a set of predictor variables that are common in the literature.
These predictor variables are: (1) the level of democracy; 114 (2) log GDP
per capita; (3) the degree to which the judiciary is independent; 115 (4)
whether the country formally recognizes the power of judicial review; 116
and (5) a post-1997 dummy to control for the change in coding
methodology of the dependent variable after 1997 by the ICRG. 117 Of
112

The labels depict ISO-3 country codes.
The risk of expropriation index ranges from 0 to 10, but takes 126 different values, making it
continuous in nature.
114
My measure of a country’s level of democracy is the “polity2” variable from the Polity IV data
set, which is widely used by political scientists. This variable ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to
-10 (strongly autocratic). See MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT: DATASET
USER’S MANUAL 8 (2007), available at http://home.bi.no/a0110709/PolityIV_manual.pdf. [http://
perma.cc/AX5J-QARF].
115
To access the Cinganelli–Richards Human Rights Dataset, see David L. Cingranelli et al., The
CIRI Human Rights Dataset, CIRI HUM. RIGHTS DATA PROJECT, http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/
data-documentation.html [http://perma.cc/S7RL-DFYF]. To access the Coding Manual, see DAVID L.
CINGRANELLI & DAVID L. RICHARDS, THE CINGRANELLI–RICHARDS (CIRI) HUMAN RIGHTS DATA
PROJECT CODING MANUAL (2014), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BxDpF6GQ-6fbWkpxTDZCQ
01jYnc [https://perma.cc/86SC-NWQQ].
116
See Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review, 30 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 587 (2014).
117
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
113
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course, the model also includes the main variable of interest: (6) the
constitutional restrictions on the power of eminent domain as captured by
the de jure expropriation index.
Figure 8 depicts the coefficients along with the 95% confidence
intervals for the predictor variables included in this model. The stars
superimposed upon the graph denote p-values of <0.01 (***), <0.05 (**),
and <0.1 (*), respectively. The graph should be interpreted as follows: we
are 95% certain that the true value of the parameter lies somewhere on the
depicted line. The graph reveals that there appears to be no observable
relationship between de jure constitutional takings provisions and de facto
expropriation risks.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis—that constitutional takings
clauses do not reduce de facto expropriation risks—does not necessarily
offer evidence for the null hypothesis. Just because the de jure
expropriation index is not statistically significantly associated with de facto
expropriation risks, does not necessarily mean that the variable has no
effect. 118 Specifically, it is possible that the effect of this variable is
substantively large but fails to achieve statistical significance because the
model is imprecisely estimated. This does not appear to be the case here:
Figure 8 reveals that the coefficient of the expropriation index is close to
zero and that the confidence intervals also fall around zero (95%
confidence intervals: -0.13 to 0.22). This suggests that the effect of de jure
takings clauses is not only statistically insignificant but also small in
substantive terms. Thus, placing more restrictions on the power of eminent
domain does not appear to improve property protections in practice.
By contrast, democracy, GDP per capita, and judicial independence
are all statistically significantly associated with de facto expropriation
risks. The findings that democratic countries, richer countries, and
countries with more judicial independence do a better job at protecting
private property are all consistent with the existing literature.119

118

See Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions 22
(Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 712, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540701 [http://perma.cc/G52P-PRPN].
119
A number of alternative regression specifications yield similar results. First, when replacing the
additive property rights scale with the predicted values for each country-year on the first factor,
obtained through common factor analysis with an orthogonal rotation, the results remain similar. See
supra note 107 (documenting the scale reliability coefficient and providing additional details on the
factor analysis). Second, when adding year fixed-effects to the baseline model, the results remain
similar. Third, when adding a linear time trend to the baseline model, the results remain similar. Finally,
replacing the country fixed-effects with a lagged dependent variable, the effect of the property rights
index becomes statistically significant at the 5% level but with a negative sign. This suggests that, if
anything, a higher de jure score is associated with higher de facto expropriation risks.
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FIGURE 8: BASELINE REGRESSION OUTPUT
(COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 120

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Not only is the overall de jure expropriation index unrelated to actual
property protections, but the same is true for the individual components.
When correlating each of the individual components of the expropriation
index with de facto expropriation risks (depicted in Table 1), most
correlations are close to zero, and in some cases negative. The one
exception is for provisions that unambiguously require “full” or “market
value” compensation. The correlation between this provision and the de
facto expropriation index is 0.18. However, this provision is not
statistically significantly associated with de facto expropriation risks after
controlling for confounding factors in the same regression model reported
in Figure 8. 121

120

This regression model includes 2523 observations and has an r-squared of 0.61.
The same is true for the other components of the de jure expropriation index: none of these are
statistically significant when included in the model from Figure 8 instead of the aggregate index.
121
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TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TAKINGS GUARANTEES
AND DE FACTO EXPROPRIATION RISKS
De Facto Expropriation Risk
Full Compensation

0.1758

Some Compensation

-0.0234

Timeliness

-0.1147

Prior Compensation

-0.0709

Procedural Guarantees

0.0518

Judicial Involvement

-0.0807

Public Interest Requirement

0.0159

In sum, the data reveals that constitutional restrictions on the power of
eminent domain do not appear to affect de facto expropriation risks.
IV. CONDITIONAL EFFECTS: FALSE POSITIVES AND FALSE NEGATIVES
Although the substantive and procedural restrictions on the power of
eminent domain appear to have little impact on de facto expropriation risks,
it is possible that they affect government behavior only under certain
conditions. This Part will first explore the theoretical explanations
developed in Part I, which all concern “false positives,” that is, countries
that adopt takings clauses in the absence of a genuine commitment to
protect private property in practice, either because the commitment is
entirely false or because it is surrounded by societal disagreements. This
Part will next provide a preliminary exploration of possible “false
negatives,” that is, countries that are committed to private property in
practice but do not enshrine strong restrictions on eminent domain in their
constitution.
A. False Positives
One possible explanation for the lack of correlation between de jure
and de facto property protections is that some constitutions are simply
disingenuous. When constitutional promises are false, the mechanisms that
are supposed to make it harder to deviate from the constitution’s promises
ex post are likely to be absent.122 If not, the government risks that the false
promises will be turned against it.123 One of the most important
mechanisms to make constitutional promises binding is judicial
independence. As noted in Part I.B, an independent judiciary can act as a
122
See supra Part I.A (singling out the availability of judicial review, the difficulty of
constitutional amendment, and the unwillingness to forgo coordination benefits as such mechanisms).
123
See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (recounting the Egyptian experience).
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neutral arbiter in property disputes between the government and private
parties and can strike down unconstitutional legislation. It is no surprise,
therefore, that investors have long used judicial independence as a proxy
for whether their investments are secure.
To explore whether the effects of takings clauses depend on judicial
independence, I re-estimate the model reported in Figure 8 but with a more
limited sample that only includes the 40% of countries that enjoy the
highest level of judicial independence according to the CIRI human rights
dataset. The CIRI data codes judicial independence on a three-point scale—
full independence, moderate independence, and no independence—based
on the annual United States State Department Country Reports on Human
Rights, the input for which is collected by American embassies around the
world. 124 The results, displayed in Figure 9, suggest that there is no
evidence that the substantive and procedural restrictions on expropriation
reduce expropriation risks in countries with high levels of judicial
independence. 125 The coefficient of the expropriation index is close to zero
and not statistically significant. By contrast, democracy and GDP per capita
are again positive and statistically significant predictors of de facto
protection against expropriation.126 Thus, even when omitting those states
that adopt takings clauses in the absence of an independent judiciary, de
jure restrictions on eminent domain and de facto expropriation risks appear
to be unrelated to each other. 127
124

See supra note 121. For a description of this methodology, see Benedikt Goderis & Mila
Versteeg, Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints, 41 J. LEGAL
STUD. 131, 150–51 (2012).
125
Also when limiting the sample to the 75% of countries with either high levels of judicial
independence or medium levels of judicial independence (omitting only the 25% of countries with the
lowest levels of judicial independence), constitutional takings provisions have no effect. I also explore
whether the presence of judicial review makes a difference. First, I limit the sample to countries that
have the highest level of judicial independence and grant the judiciary the power of judicial review (as
coded by Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 122). Second, I limit the sample to countries that have the
highest or medium levels of judicial independence and grant the judiciary the power of judicial review.
In both cases, there is still no effect of constitutional takings clauses.
126
The 95% confidence intervals for the expropriation index are larger than for the baseline model
presented in Figure 8 (95% confidence interval: 0.20 to 0.64), raising the possibility that there exists a
substantively meaningful but imprecisely estimated effect.
127
Although judicial independence is the main focus of the comparative constitutional law
literature, it is not the only mechanism that can make constitutional constraints binding. Another
potential mechanism is democracy. Constitutional commitments can be enforced through the
democratic process, especially when these commitments are majoritarian in nature. Thus, when takings
clauses reflect majoritarian preferences, they might effectively reduce expropriation risks in democratic
countries. Conversely, authoritarian regimes might adopt takings clauses for disingenuous reasons,
suggesting that takings clauses in authoritarian regimes will fail to reduce expropriation risks. To
explore democracy’s impact, I re-estimate the model reported in Figure 8 for a subsample of democratic
and autocratic countries respectively. Countries with a polity score of six or higher are considered to be
democratic for this purpose. This threshold is commonly used in the literature. See, e.g., Simmons,
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FIGURE 9: SUB-SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES WITH FULLY INDEPENDENT JUDICIARIES ONLY
(COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 128

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

A second explanation for the lack of correlation between de jure and
de facto property protections holds that, in some countries, constitutional
restrictions on the power of eminent domain might enjoy only partial
popular support. Where the constitution places stronger restrictions on the
power of eminent domain than the level of restrictions preferred by a
majority of people, political majorities might use their political clout to
undermine the constitution’s takings clause. It is difficult to assess whether
constitutions are elite products that deviate from popular opinion; such an
assessment requires in-depth case studies, which are beyond the scope of
this Essay. 129 Although it is difficult to establish which groups were most
influential in writing the constitution, it is relatively easy to detect the
ambiguities that are built into the constitution’s design. As discussed,

supra note 15, at 83; Law & Versteeg, supra note 46, at 178. In neither one of these samples, however,
is the de jure expropriation index statistically significantly correlated with de facto expropriation risks.
In other words, takings clauses in democratic and autocratic constitutions alike fail to reduce de facto
expropriation risks. For the subsample of democratic countries, observations (N) = 1319 and the rsquared is 0.64. For the subsample of autocratic countries, N = 1204 and the r-squared is 0.59. When
classifying countries with a polity2 score of 4 or higher as democratic, the results are the same.
128
This model includes 905 observations and has an r-squared of 0.79.
129
At the same time, the finding that takings clauses fail to matter even in democracies hints at the
possibility that takings clauses lack popular support. See supra note 133. Further research is needed to
explore this possibility.
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numerous constitutions include ambiguities and contradictions that lend
themselves to quantitative coding.
To explore the impact of such ambiguities, I re-estimate the model
reported in Figure 8 but with a more limited sample that only includes the
77% of countries that do not include any fine print in their constitutions at
all. The results, depicted in Figure 10, suggest that when accounting for the
constitution’s fine print, there does exist a positive and statistically
significant relationship between de jure takings clauses and reduced de
facto expropriation risks. In the subsample of countries without fine print,
the de jure expropriation index is positive and statistically significant, albeit
only at the 10%-level. 130 Specifically, a 1-point increase on the
expropriation index (that ranges from 0 to 7, and for which 7 denotes the
highest level of protection) is associated with a 0.18-point increase on the
de facto risk of expropriation measure (that ranges from 0 to 10; and for
which 10 denotes the highest level of protection). By contrast, in the
subsample that only includes the constitutions with fine print (reported in
Figure 11), the original expropriation index has a negative effect, although
not statistically significant.131 In other words, these findings suggest that
when constitutions unambiguously protect private property, more
restrictions on the power of eminent domain are correlated with a
statistically significant decrease in expropriation risks. Yet where
constitutions include “fine print” ambiguities, which can potentially water
down restrictions on the power of eminent domain, de jure takings clauses
do not appear to cause a reduction in expropriation risks.

130
The significance level increases when using alternative definitions of fine print. See supra notes
144–46 and accompanying text.
131
Note, however, that the 95 % confidence intervals for the expropriation index are fairly large in
this specification (95% confidence intervals: -0.65 to 0.27) raising the possibility that the expropriation
index has a substantively meaningful negative effect that is imprecisely estimated. As an alternative
strategy, I also explored the effect of the fine print by estimating the regression model reported in
Figure 8 with an alternative expropriation index that is adjusted downward to zero whenever one of the
red-flag provisions is present in the constitution, but that takes its original value otherwise. When doing
so, there is a positive relationship between de jure takings clauses and reduced de facto risk of
expropriation, but the p-value is 0.15, suggesting it falls just outside conventional levels of statistical
significance.
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FIGURE 10: SUB-SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES WITHOUT FINE PRINT
(COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 132

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
FIGURE 11: SUB-SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES WITH FINE PRINT
(COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) 133

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

132
133

This model includes 1484 observations and has an r-squared of 0.67.
This model includes 1039 observations and has an r-squared 0.44.
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These effects become even stronger when adding two constitutional
features for which it was not a priori clear whether they should be classified
as “fine print” to the group of constitutions that include fine print:
(1) limitation clauses that make property subordinate to the common good
and (2) constitutions that place the takings clause outside the bill of rights.
To explore the impact of these features, I first repeat the analysis reported
in Figures 10 and 11 but add the constitutions that place the takings clause
outside the bill of rights to the subset of constitutions with fine print. When
doing so, the de jure expropriation index is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level in the subsample of countries without fine print
in their constitutions, while it is negative but statistically insignificant in
the sample of countries with fine print. 134 I next repeat the analysis reported
in Figures 10 and 11 but add the clauses that subordinate private property
to the common good to the definition of fine print. When doing so, the de
jure expropriation index is positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level in the sample of countries without fine print in their constitutions,
while it is negative but statistically insignificant in the sample of countries
with fine print. 135 Finally, I repeat the analysis reported in Figures 10 and
11 but add both types of provisions to the definition of fine print. Also in
this case, the de jure expropriation index is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level in the subsample of countries without fine print
in their constitutions and negative but not significant in the sample with
fine print. 136 This suggests that the overall finding that societal
disagreements matter is robust compared to alternative definitions of what
constitutes the constitution’s fine print. Indeed, the various provisions that
capture fine print are all positively correlated with each other.137
Taken together, these findings suggest that when constitutions include
contradictory property provisions, the exceptions become the rule, and the
main takings clause will be undermined in practice. At the same time, when
countries commit to protect private property without caveats, constitutional
restrictions on eminent domain do appear to be correlated with de facto
expropriation risks. Of course, the analysis does not conclusively establish
that constitutional contradictions indeed result from societal disagreements.
134
This model includes 1230 observations and has an r-squared of 0.67. The coefficient of the de
jure expropriation index in this sample without fine print is 0.20 (compared with 0.18 in Figure 10).
135
This model includes 1196 observations and has an r-squared of 0.67. The coefficient of the de
jure expropriation index in this sample without fine print is 0.21 (compared with 0.18 in Figure 10).
136
This model includes 961 observations and has an r-squared of 0.66. The coefficient of the de
jure expropriation index in this sample without fine print is 0.22 (compared with 0.18 in Figure 10).
137
Performing common factor analysis with a varimax rotation on all the possible fine print
provisions suggests that one underlying factor accounts for all of the shared variance among the
different fine print variables. Both the Kaiser test and scree elbow test moreover reveal that for this
data, one factor should be retained. See DEVELLIS, supra note 107, at 128–32.
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Nor does it sufficiently address possible endogeneity of takings clauses to
draw any definite conclusions about the causes of these clauses’ impact.
Yet, this Essay’s findings at least tentatively suggest that the politics at the
time of constitution-writing could be a crucially important predictor of
takings clauses’ future performance.
B. False Negatives
The analysis thus far has focused exclusively on “false positives,” that
is, countries that adopt constitutional takings clauses without a genuine
commitment to respect private property in practice.138 The focus on false
positives follows logically from the theoretical literature on property rights,
which emphasizes the economic benefits associated with constitutional
restrictions on the power of eminent domain. The literature therefore
predicts that countries will be incentivized to constitutionally restrict
eminent domain power, and invites a focus on why such restrictions do not
work in practice. Yet it is possible that the lack of correlation between de
jure and de facto property rights is in part explained by what Professor
Simmons describes as “false negatives,” that is, countries that respect
private property in practice and yet do not place constitutional restrictions
on the power of eminent domain. 139 There is no clear theoretical foundation
for this phenomenon; the conventional wisdom, after all, holds that
countries that genuinely intend to respect and protect private property
benefit from adopting constitutional takings clauses. Constitutional takings
clauses, after all, signal credibility to investors, capital markets, and
citizens alike, which might help a government to reap the economic
benefits associated with secure property rights.
Yet, Figure 7 suggests that at least some countries overperform
relative to their constitutional promises. One possible group of countries
that might be reluctant to enshrine takings clauses into their constitutions,
even when they do respect private property in practice, are the common law
countries. Common law countries typically have a strong tradition of
judicial interpretation of constitutional text, and may therefore omit some
of the more specific restrictions on the power of eminent domain from the
text itself. To explore this possibility, I estimate the same baseline model as
reported in Figure 8, but exclude the common law countries from the
sample. This exercise reveals no evidence that common law countries drive
the results. Also in this restricted sample, the de jure restrictions on the
power of eminent domain do not explain de facto expropriation risks.140 In

138
139
140

See SIMMONS, supra note 15, at 17–18.
Id.
This model includes 1746 observations and has an r-squared of 0.60.
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other words, even when excluding common law countries as possible false
negatives, there is no relationship between constitutional takings clauses
and reduced expropriation risks.
A second possible group of “false negatives” are those countries that
possess “modest” constitutions. 141 Modest constitutions are characterized
by an absence of rights protections in the constitutional text even when
those rights are protected in practice. The phenomenon of the modest
constitution suggests that some countries are generally reluctant to enshrine
rights in their constitution, which might also affect the degree to which they
adopt property rights. Law and Versteeg classify a portion of the world’s
constitutions as modest based on their assessment of each constitution’s
performance on fifteen individual rights (not including property rights).142
To explore whether modest constitutions affect the results, I re-estimate the
model reported in Figure 8, but exclude all the modest constitutions from
the sample. This exercise reveals that even in this more restricted sample,
de jure restrictions on the power of eminent domain and de facto
expropriation risks are not statistically significantly correlated with each
other. 143 Overall, this initial analysis reveals no evidence to suggest that the
disconnect between de jure and de facto property rights is caused by false
negatives.
CONCLUSION
There exists a longstanding debate over whether constitutions are more
than mere parchment barriers. Though the debate traces back to at least
James Madison, remarkably little is known about the circumstances under
which constitutions actually matter. This Essay has offered an initial
empirical exploration of this question in the context of constitutional
takings clauses. It finds that takings clauses seen in isolation convey little
information on the degree to which private property is in fact secure from
government expropriation. Indeed, even takings clauses that are interpreted
and enforced by an independent judiciary do not seem to reduce de facto
expropriation risks. Yet, when taking into account the constitution’s fine
print, there does appear to be a relationship between the de jure restrictions
on expropriation and de facto expropriation risks.
It is important to note that this Essay does not exhaust the topic.
Although it establishes with some certainty that there is no relationship
between de jure and de facto expropriation risks in the aggregate, it has not
explored all possible conditions under which takings clauses might make a

141
142
143
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Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 16, at 882.
Id. at 883–85.
This model includes 2332 observations and has an r-squared of 0.59.
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difference. In recent years, there has been a growing consensus that when
empirically exploring the effectiveness of de jure rights, researchers should
not focus on aggregate effects in all countries, but rather explore the
conditions under which rights do matter. 144 This Essay has merely brushed
the surface of such an inquiry by examining a limited number of possible
conditions, relating to judicial independence and ambiguities in the
constitution’s design. Future research is needed to delve further into the
conditions under which takings clauses might make a difference in
practice. 145
Even with those limitations in mind, this Essay reveals an important
theoretical point. With its focus on the politics surrounding the
constitution’s adoption, this Essay fits with what Professor Hirschl has
dubbed the “realist” tradition in comparative constitutional law, that is, a
growing number of studies that explore how politics affect a constitution’s
substance. 146 Well-known studies in the realist tradition have explored how
elites, ruling coalitions, or both were able to shape a constitution’s design
to fit their own preferences. Some qualitative studies have even focused
specifically on how societal disagreements produce contradictions and
ambiguities. 147 Yet, few studies have connected the politics of constitutionmaking to the future operation of the constitution. While this short Essay
leaves many questions unanswered, it suggests that the political conditions
surrounding the constitution’s adoption could crucially impact the
constitution’s future operation. It is possible that this dynamic is not unique
to takings clauses alone, but also characterizes the operation of other
constitutional commitments. More research is therefore needed on
constitutions’ fine print and, more generally, on how the circumstances
surrounding the constitution’s adoption affect its future operation. Indeed,
it is possible that one of the most important predictors of constitutional
success is not the substance of the document, but the conditions under
which it was adopted.

144

An example of a study that explores conditional effect is SIMMONS, supra note 15.
This Essay also did not account for bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which often come with
a standardized template for a constitutional takings clause. At least in theory, it is possible that takings
clauses matter more when supplemented by BITs, or, alternatively, that BITs have an impact on de
facto expropriation risks even when constitutional takings clauses do not.
146
See Hirschl, Strategic Foundations, supra note 65, at 157–58; see also TOM GINSBURG,
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 22–25 (2003)
(discussing how strategic political considerations impact the establishment of judicial review).
147
See supra Part I.B.2.
145
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